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December 15, 2008
Cloud computing has been described as a trade off between sovereignty and efficiency. Where is security (aka Risk Transfer) in this debate?
Chris Hoff notes that yesterday’s SaaS providers (Monster, Salesforce) are now styled as cloud computing providers in his post .
CIOs, under increasing cost pressure, may begin to accept the efficiency argument that cloud vendors have economies of scale in both the acquisition and operations of the data center.
But hold up…
To what extent is the risk transferred when you move data to the cloud? To a very limited extent, at most to the SLA. This is similar to the debate where one claims compliance (Hannaford, NYC and now sadly Mumbai) but attacks take place anyway, causing great damage. Would an SLA save the Manager in such cases? Unlikely.
In any case, the generic cloud vendor does not understand your assets or your business. At most, they can understand threats, in general terms. They will no doubt commit to the SLA but these usually refer to availability not security.
Thus far, general purpose, low cost utility or “cloud” infrastructure (such as Azure or EC2), or SaaS vendors (salesforce.com) do not have very sophisticated security features built in.
So as you ponder the Sovereignty v/s Efficiency tradeoff, spare a thought for security.
December 12, 2008
Don’t look now, but the Web 2.0 wave is crashing onto corporate beaches everywhere. Startups, software vendors, and search engine powerhouses are all providing online accounts and services for users to create wikis, blogs, etc. for collaborating and sharing corporate data, often without the knowledge or involvement of IT or in-house legal counsel.
November 14, 2008
Search engines are now well established as a vital feature of IT and applications continue to evolve in breadth and depth at dizzying rates. It is tempting to try and reduce any and all problems to one of query construction against an index. Can Security Information and Event Management or SIEM be (force) fitted into the search paradigm?
The answer depends on what you are looking to do and your skill with query construction.
If you are an expert with detailed knowledge of log formats and content, you may find it easy to construct a suitable query. When launched against a suitably indexed log collection, results can be gratifyingly fast and accurate. This is however a limited use-case in the SIEM universe of use-cases. This model usually applies when Administrators are seeking to resolve Operational problems.
Security analysts however are usually searching for behavior and not simple text searches. While this is the holy grail of search engines, attempts from Excite (1996) to Accoona (RIP Oct 2008) never made the cut. In the SIEM world, the context problem is compounded by myriad formats and the lack of any standard to assign meaning to logs even within one vendor’s products and versions of a product.
All is not lost, SIEM vendors do offer solutions by way of pre-packaged reports and the best ones offer users the ability to perform analysis of behavior within a certain context (as opposed to simple text search). By way of example – show me all failed logins after 6PM; from this set, show only those that failed on SERVER57; from this set show me those for User4; now go back and show me all User4 activity after 6PM on all machines.
Don’t try this with a “simple” text search engine….or like John Wayne in The Searchers, you may become bitter and middle aged.
November 09, 2008
Cutting through SIEM/Log Management vendor hype While there is little doubt that SIEM solutions are critical for compliance, security monitoring or IT optimization, it is getting harder for buyers to find the right product for their needs. The reason for this is two fold; firstly, there are a number of products available and vendors have done a great job of making their products sound roughly the same in core features such as correlation, reporting, collection, etc.
November 05, 2008
When Wall Street really began to implode a couple of weeks ago one of the remarkable side-effects of the plunge was a huge increase of download activity in all items related to ROI on the Prism website. A sign of the times as ROI always becomes more important in times of tight budgets, and our prospects were seeing the lean times coming. So what does the likelihood of budget freezes or worse mean for how SIEM/Log Management is used or how it is justified in the enterprise?
Compliance is and will remain the great budget enabler of SIEM and Log Management but often a compliance project can be done in a far more minimal deployment and still meet the requirement. There is, however, enormous tangible and measurable benefit in Log Management beyond the compliance use case that has been largely ignored.
SIEM/Log Management for the most part has been seen (and positioned by us vendors) as a compliance solution with security benefits or in some cases a security solution that does compliance. Both of these have a hard ROI to measure as it is based on a company’s tolerance for risk. A lot of SIEM functionality, and the log management areas in particular, is also enormously effective in increasing operational efficiencies – and provides clear, measurable, fast and hard ROI. Very simply, compliance will keep you out of jail, security reduces risk, but by using SIEM products for operations you will save hard dollars on administrator costs and reduce system down-time which in turn increases productivity that directly hits the bottom line. Plus you still get the compliance and security for free effectively. A year ago when we used to show these operational features to prospects (mostly security personnel) they were greeted 9 out of 10 times with a polite yawn. Not anymore.
We believe this new cost conscious buying behavior will also drive broader rather than deeper requirements in many mid-tier businesses. It is the “can I get 90% of my requirements, and 100% of the mandatory ones in several areas, and is that better than 110% in a single area?” discussion. Recently Prism added some enhanced USB device monitoring capability in EventTracker. While it is beyond what typical SIEM vendors provide in that we track files written and deleted on the USB drive in real-time, I would not consider it to be as good as a best of breed DLP provider. But for most people it gets them where they need to be and is included in EventTracker for no additional cost. It is amazing the level of interest this functionality receives today from prospects while at the same time you get correspondingly less interest in features with a dubious ROI like many correlation use cases. Interesting times.
-Posted by Steve Lafferty
October 29, 2008
The Economist opines that the world is flirting with recession and IT may suffer; which in turn will hasten the move to “cloud computing”, which in a pithy distillation is described as “a trade-off between sovereignty and efficiency”.
Computing as a borderless utility? Whereas most privacy laws assume data resides in one place…the cloud makes data seem present everywhere and nowhere.
In a recent post Steve differentiated between security OF the cloud and security IN the cloud. This led us to an analysis of cloud computing as it is currently offered by Amazon AWS, Google Apps and Zoho.
From a risk perspective, security of content IN the cloud is essentially considered your problem by Amazon whereas Google and Zoho say “trust in me, just in me”. When pressed, Google says “we do not recommend Google Apps for content subject to compliance regulations” but is apparently working to assuage concerns about access control.
However moving your data to the cloud does not absolve you from responsibility on who accessed it for what purpose — the main concern of auditors everywhere.
At the present time, neither Google nor Zoho make any audit trail available to subscribers while at Amazon it’s your problem. We think widespread adoption by the business community (and what of the federal government?) will require significant transparency to provide visibility. This is also true for popular hosted applications like Intuit Quickbooks and Salesforce.
As Alex notes “…in order to gain that visibility, our insight into Cloud Risk Management must include significant provisions for understanding a joint ability to Prevent/Detect/Respond as well as provisions for managing the risk that one of the participants won’t provide that visibility or ability via SLA’s and penalties.”
Clear as mud.
October 24, 2008
In a recent post I talked a little about the security and compliance issues facing companies that adopt cloud-based SaaS for any mission-critical function. I referred to this as security OF the cloud to differentiate it from a cloud-based security offering or security IN the cloud. This is going to pose a major change in the security industry if it takes off.
Take a typical small business “SmallCo” as an example – They depend on a combination of Quickbooks and an accounting firm for their financial processes. For all practical purposes SmallCo outsources the entire accounting function. They use a hosting company to host Quickbooks for a monthly fee, and their external CPA, internal management and accounts staff access the application for data processing. Very easy to manage, no upfront investment, no servers to maintain, all the usual reasons why a SaaS model is so appealing.
One can easily argue the crown jewels of SmallCo’s entire business are resident in that hosted solution. SmallCo began to question whether this critical data was secure from being hacked or stolen. Would SmallCo be compliant if they were obligated to follow a compliance standard? Is it the role of the hosting provider to ensure security and compliance? To all of those questions there was and is no clear cut answer. SmallCo is provided access to the application and can have access to any audit capability that is supported in the Quickbook product (which is not a great deal), and there is no ability to collect that audit and usage data other than to manually run a report. At the time SmallCo began it did not seem to be important but as SmallCo grew so did their exposure.
Salesforce, another poster child for SaaS, is much the same. I read a while back they were going to put the ability to monitor changes in some of their database fields in their Winter 2008 release. But there appears to be nothing for user level auditing or even admin auditing (of your staff much less theirs). A trusted user can steal an entire customer list and not even have to be in the office to do it. The best DLP technology will not help you as it can be accessed and exported through any web browser on any machine. Having used Salesforce in previous companies I can personally attest, however, that it is a fine CRM system, cost-effective, powerful and well-designed. But you have to maintain a completely separate access control list, and you have no real ability to monitor what is accessed by whom for audit purposes. For a prospect with privacy concerns is it really a viable, secure solution?
Cloud based computing changes the entire paradigm of security. Perimeter defense is the first step of a defense in depth to protect service availability and corporate data, but what happens when there is no data resident to be defended? In fact, when there are a number of services in the cloud, is event management going to be viable? Will the rules be the same when you are correlating events from different services on the cloud?
So here is the challenge I believe — as more and more mission critical processes are moved to the cloud, SaaS suppliers are going to have to provide log data in a real-time, straight forward manner, probably for their admins as well as their customers’ personnel. In fact since there is only a browser and login and no firewall, network or operating system level security to breach, auditing would have to be very, very robust. With all these cloud services is it feasible that an auditor will accept 50 reports from 50 providers and pass the company under audit? Maybe, but someone – either the end-user or a MSSP has to be responsible for monitoring for security and compliance, and unless the application and data is under the control of end-users, they will be unable to do so
So If I were an application provider like Salesforce I would be thinking really hard about being a good citizen in a cloud based world. Like providing real-time audit records for at least user log-on and log-off, log-on failures and a complete audit record of all data extracts as a first step, as well as a method to push the events out in real-time. I would likely do that before I worried too much about auditing fields in the database.
October 14, 2008
Performing well during a security “Every crisis offers you extra desired power” William Moulton Marston Jasmine’s corollary: “Only if you perform well during that crisis.” Crises will happen no matter how many precautions we take. The need to blame someone is a human desire and it is easy to focus that on the crisis response team, because they are visible. Yet when teams perform well during the crisis they don’t merely avoid blame. They do garner the potential to become powerful advisors or outright leaders. It’s even better if you can also demonstrate that lessons learned from past crises are making the current environment more secure. After all, the Justice League members wouldn’t be heroes if no one knew about their actions. But what does it mean to perform well in a crisis?
September 29, 2008
There is a lot of discussion around Security MSSPs, SaaS (Security as a Service) and Cloud Computing these days. I always felt I had a pretty good handle on MSSPs and SaaS. The way I look at it, you tend to outsource the entire task to Security MSSPs. If you outsource your firewall security, for instance, you generally have no one on staff that worries about firewall logs and you count on your MSSP partner to keep you secure – at least with regards to the firewall. The MSSP collects, stores and reviews the logs. With SaaS, using the same firewall example above, you outsource the delivery of the capability — the mechanics of the collection and storage tasks and the software and hardware that enable it, but you still have IT personnel on staff that are responsible for the firewall security. These guys review the logs, run the reports etc. This general definition is the same for any security task, whether it is email security, firewall or SIEM.
OK, so far, so good. This is all pretty simple.
Then you add Cloud Computing and everything gets a little, well, cloudy. People start to interchange concepts freely, and in fact when you talk to somebody about cloud computing and what it means to them, it is often completely different than what you thought cloud computing to be. I always try to ask – Do you mean security IN the cloud, i.e. using an external provider to manage some part of the collection, storage and analysis of your security data (If so go to SaaS or MSSP)? Or do you mean security OF the cloud — the collection/management of security information from corporate applications that are delivered via SaaS (Software as a Service, think Salesforce)?
The latter case has really nothing to do with either Security SaaS or MSSP since you could be collecting the data from the applications such as Salesforce into a security solution you own and host. The problem is an entirely different one. Think about how to collect and correlate data from applications you have no control over, or, how these outsourced applications affect your compliance requirements. Most often compliance regulations require you to review access to certain types of critical data. How do you do that when the assets are not under your control? Do you simply trust that the service provider is doing it right? And what will your auditor do when they show up to do an audit? How do you guarantee chain of custody of the log data when you have no control over how, when, and where it was created? Quickly a whole lot of questions suddenly pop up that there appear to be no easy answers.
So here are a few observations:
The combination of the above is very likely going to become a bigger and bigger issue, and if not addressed will prevent the adoption of cloud computing.
September 19, 2008
So you decided that it’s time to manage your security information. Your trigger was probably one of a) Got handed a directive from up high “The company shall be fully compliant with applicable regulation [insert one] PCI/HIPAA/SOX/GLBA/FISMA/Basel/…” b) Had a security incident and realized OMG we really need to keep those logs.
Upside: It’ll be perfect, it’ll be cheap, it’ll be fun
Downside: Who will maintain, extend, support (me?), how will it scale?
Upside: Don’t need the hardware or staff, pay-go, someone else will deal with the issues
Downside: Really? Someone else will deal with the issues? How do you get access to your info? What is the SLA?
Upside: Get a solution now, upgrades happen, you have someone to blame
Downside: You still have to learn/use it, is the vendor stable?
What is the best choice?
Well, how generic are your requirements?
What sort of resources can you apply to this task?
How comfortable are you with IT? [From ‘necessary evil’…to… ‘We are IT!’] What sort of log volume and sources do you have?
Outsource if you have – generic requirements, limited sources/volume and low IT skills
Build if you have – programming skills, fixed requirements, limited sources/volume
Buy if you have – varied (but standard) sources, good IT skills,
As Pat Riley says “Look for your choices, pick the best one, then go with it.”
September 16, 2008
Data leakage and the end of the world Most of the time when IT folk talk about data leakage they mean employees emailing sensitive documents to Gmail accounts or exposing the company through peer-to-peer networks or the burgeoning use of social networking services.
August 28, 2008
The Ford Pinto was a subcompact manufactured by Ford (introduced on 9/11/70 — another infamous coincidence?). It became a focus of a major scandal when it was alleged that the car’s design allowed its fuel tank to be easily damaged in the event of a rear-end collision, which sometimes resulted in deadly fires and explosions. Ford was aware of this design flaw but allegedly refused to pay what was characterized as the minimal expense of a redesign. Instead, it was argued, Ford decided it would be cheaper to pay off possible lawsuits for resulting deaths. The resulting liability case produced a judicial opinion that is a staple of remedy courses in American law schools.
What brought this on? Well, a recent conversation with a healthcare institution went something like this:
Us: Are you required to comply with HIPAA?
Them: Well, I suppose…yes
Us: So how do you demonstrate compliance?
Them: Well, we’ve never been audited and don’t know anyone that has
Us: So you don’t have a solution in place for this?
Them: Not really…but if they ever come knocking, I’ll pull some reports and wiggle out of it
Us: But there is a better, much better way with all sorts of upside
Them: Yeah, yeah whatever…how much did you say this “better” way costs?
Us: Paltry sum
Them: Well why should I bother? A) I don’t know anyone that has been audited. B) I’ve got better uses for the money in these tough times. C) If they come knocking, I’ll plead ignorance and ask for “reasonable time” to demonstrate compliance. D) In any case, if I wait long enough Microsoft and Cisco will probably solve this for me in the next release.
Us: Heavy sigh
Sadly..none of this is true and there is overwhelming evidence of that.
Regulations are not intended to be punitive of course and implementing log management in reality provides positive ROI
August 08, 2008
Hot server virtualization and cold compliance Without a doubt, server virtualization is a hot technology. NetworkWorld reported: “More than 40% of respondents listed consolidation as a high priority for the next year, and just under 40% said virtualization is more directly on their radar.” They also reported that server virtualization remains one of IT’s top initiatives even as IT executives are bracing themselves for potential spending cuts. Another survey of 100 US companies shows 60% of the respondents are currently using virtualization in production to support non-mission-critical business services. In other words, they are using it in a “production sandbox” before deploying it on a large scale.
July 23, 2008
In a recent post Raffael Marty points out the shortcomings of a “classic” SIM solution including high cost in part due to a clumsy, expensive tuning process.
More importantly, he points out that SIM’s were designed for network-based attacks and these are on the wane, replaced by host-based attacks.
At Prism, we’ve long argued that a host-based system is more appropriate and effective. This is further borne out by the appearance of polymorphic strains such as Nugache that now dominate Threatscape 2008.
However is “IT Search” the complete answer? Not quite. As a matter of fact, any such “silver bullet” has never worked out. Fact is, users (especially in mid-tier) are driven by security concerns, so proactive correlation is useful (in moderation), compliance remains a major driver and event reduction with active alerting is absolutely essential for the overworked admin. That said “IT Search” is a useful and powerful tool in the arsenal of the modern, knowledgeable Security Warrior.
A “Complete SIM” solution is more appropriate for the enterprise. Such a solution blends the “classic” approach which is based on log consolidation and multi-event correlation from host and network devices PLUS a white/greylist scanner PLUS the Log Search function. Long term storage and flexible reporting/forensic tools round out the ideal feature set. Such a solution has better potential to satisfy the different user profiles. These include Auditors, Managers and Security Staff, many of who are less comfortable with query construction.
One dimensional approaches such as “IT Search” or “Network Behavior Anomaly Detection” or “Network Packet Correlation” while undeniably useful are in themselves limited.
Complete SIM, IT Search included, that’s the ticket.
July 15, 2008
Fear, boredom and the pursuit of compliance When it comes right down to it, we try to comply with regulations and policies because we are afraid of the penalties. Penalties such as corporate fines and jail time may be for the executive club, but everyone is affected when the U.S. Federal Trade Commission starts directly overseeing your security audits and risk assessment programs for 20 years. Just ask the IT folks at TJX Cos Inc. Then there are the hits to the top line as customers get shy about using their credit cards with you, and the press has fun raking you through the mud.
July 02, 2008
I have been thinking a bit on scalability lately – and I thought it might be an interesting exercise to examine a couple of the obvious places in a SIEM solution where scalability problems can be exposed. In a previous post I talked about scalability and EPS. The fact is there are multiple areas in a SIEM solution where the system may not scale and anyone thinking of a SIEM procurement should be thinking of scalability as a multi-dimensional beast.
First, all the logs you care about need to be dependably collected. Collection is where many vendors build EPS benchmarks – but generally the number of events per second is based on a small normalized packet. Event size varies widely depending on source so understand your typical log size, and calculate accordingly. The general mitigation strategies for collection are faster collection hardware (collection is usually a CPU intensive task), distributed collection architecture, and log filtering.
One thing to think off — log generation is often quite “bursty” in nature. You will, for instance, get a slew of logs generated on Monday mornings when staff arrive to work and start logging onto system resources. You should evaluate what happens if the system gets overloaded – do the events get lost, does the system crash?
As a mitigation strategy, Event filtering is sometimes pooh-poohed , however the reality is that 90% of traffic generated by most devices consists of completely useless (from a security perspective) status information. Volume varies widely depending on audit settings as well. A company generating 600,000 events per day on a windows network can easily generate 10-fold as much by increasing their audit settings slightly. . If you need the audit levels high, filtering is the easiest way to ease pressure on the entire down-stream log system.
Collection is a multi-step process also. Simply receiving an event is too simplistic a view. Resources are expended running policy and rules against the event stream. The more processing, the more system resources consumed. The data must be committed to the event store at some point so it needs to get written to disk. It is highly advisable to look at these as 3 separate activities and validate that the solution can handle your volume successfully.
A note on log storage for those who are considering buying an appliance with a fixed amount of onboard storage – be sure it is enough, and be sure to check out how easy it is to move off, retrieve and process records that have been moved to offline storage media. If your event volume eats up your disk you will likely be doing a lot of the moving off, moving back on activity. Also, some of the compliance standards like PCI require that logs must be stored online a certain amount of time. Here at Prism we solved that problem by allowing events to be stored anywhere on the file system, but most appliances do not afford you that luxury.
Now let’s flip our attention over to the analytics and reporting activities. This is yet another important aspect of scalability that is often ignored. If a system can process 10 million events per minute but takes 10 hours to run a simple query you probably are going to have upset users and a non-viable solution. And what happens to the collection throughput above when a bunch of people are running reports? Often a single user running ad-hoc reports is just fine, put a couple on and you are in trouble.
A remediation strategy here is to look for a solution that can offload the reporting and analytics to another machine so as not to impact the aggregation, correlation and storage steps. If you don’t have that capability absolutely press the vendor for performance metrics if reports and collection are done on the same hardware.
– Steve Lafferty
June 16, 2008
Often when I engage with a prospect their first question is “How many events per second (EPS) can EventTracker handle?” People tend to confuse EPS with scalability so by simply giving back an enormous-enough number (usually larger than the previous vendor they spoke with) it convinces them your product is, indeed, scalable. The fact is scalability and Events per Second (EPS) are not the same and many vendors get away from the real scalability issue by intentionally using the two interchangeably. A high EPS rating does not guarantee a scalable solution.If the only measure of scalability available is an EPS rating, you as a prospect should be asking yourself a simple question. What is the vendor definition of EPS? You will generally find that the answer is different with each vendor.
At the end of the day, an EPS measure is generally a measure of a small, non-typical normalized event received. Nothing measured about actually doing something useful with the event, and indeed, pretty much useless.
With the lack of definition of what an event actually is, EPS is also a terrible comparative measure. You cannot assume that one vendor claiming 12,000EPS is faster than another claiming 10,000EPS as they are often measuring very different things. A good analogy would be if you asked someone how far away an object was, and they replied 100. For all the usefulness of the EPS measure the unit could be inches or miles.
EPS is even worse for ascertaining true solution capability. Some vendors market appliances that promise 2,000 EPS and 150 GB disk space for log storage. They also promise to archive security events for multiple years to meet compliance. For the sake of argument let’s assume the system is receiving, processing and storing 1000 windows events/sec with an average 1K event size (a common size for a Windows event). In 24 hours you will receive 86 million events. Compressed at 90% this consumes 8.6GB or almost 7% of your storage in a single day. Even with heavy compression it can handle only a few weeks of data with this kind of load. Think of buying a car with an engine that can race to 200MPH and a set of tires and suspension that cannot go faster that 75MPH. The car can’t go 200, the engine can, but the car can’t. A SIEM solution is the car in this example, not the engine. Having the engine does not do you any good at all.
So when asked about EPS, I sigh, and say it depends, and try to explain all this. Sometimes it sinks in, sometimes not. All in all don’t pay a lot of attention to EPS – it is largely an empty measure until the unit of measure is standardized, and even then it will only be a small part of overall system capability.
June 12, 2008
Creating lasting change from security management Over the past year, I’ve dealt with how to implement a Pragmatic approach to security management and then dug deeper into the specifics of how to successfully implement a security management environment successfully. Think of those previous tips as your high school level education in security management.
June 04, 2008
Windows does not track drive mappings for auditing out of the box. To audit drive mappings you will need to do the following steps:
Windows will now generate event ids 560, 567 and 564 when the drive mappings are added or deleted. 564 will be generated when a mapping is deleted, 567 will be created when a mapping is deleted or added and 560 will be generated both times as well. Event ID’s 567 and 564 will not give you the full information that you are looking for, they will tell you what was done to the mappings but not WHICH mapping. To determine which mapping you will need,the Handle ID code that will be found in the event description on the 564/567 events. The Handle ID will allow you to track back to the 560 event which will give you the mapping that is being added/deleted. Event ID 567 will only be generated on Windows XP or Windows 2003 systems, Windows 2000 will not generate 567.
May 21, 2008
As the market matures we are increasingly being contacted by prospects that are looking not to implement SIM technology, but instead are looking to replace existing SIM technology. These are people that purchased a couple of budget cycles ago, struggled with their selection and are now throwing up their hands in frustration and moving on. From a high level, the reason for this adoption failure was not that SIM was bad or unnecessary. These people were, and remain, convinced of the benefits of a SIM solution, but at the time of their initial purchase many did not have a detailed understanding of both their business and technical requirements, nor a clear understanding of the actual investment in time and effort necessary to make their SIM implementation a success.
For new prospects just getting into SIM – is there a lesson to be learned from these people? The answer to that is a resounding “yes”, and it is worthwhile digging a little deeper than a generic “understand your requirements before you buy” (that is a really good thing, but a bit obvious!), and let you hear some of the more common themes we hear.
Just as a bit of stage setting, the majority of the customers Prism serves tend to be what are classically called SMEs (Small and Medium Enterprises). Although a company might be considered SME, it is not uncommon today for even smaller enterprises to have well in excess of a thousand systems and devices that need to be managed. Implementing Security Information Management (SIM) poses a special challenge for SMEs, as events and security data from even a thousand devices can be completely overwhelming. SMEs are “tweeners” – They have a relatively big problem (like large enterprises), but less flexibility (in terms of money, time and people) to solve it. SMEs are also pulled by vendors from all ends of the spectrum – you have low end vendors coming in and positioning very inexpensive, point solutions, and very high-end vendors pitching their wares, sometimes in a special package for you. So the gamut of options are very, very broad.
So here they are, the top 10, in no particular order as we hear these all too frequently:
May 17, 2008
Is it better to leave some logs behind? Log management has emerged in the past few years as a must-do discipline in IT for complying with regulatory standards, and protecting the integrity of critical IT assets. However, with millions of logs being spit out on a daily basis by firewalls, routers, servers, workstations, applications and other sources across a network, enterprises are deluged with log data and there is no stemming the tide.
April 23, 2008
In life and business, the smart approach is to make the most of what you have. You can work for 8 hours and 10 hours and then 12 hours a day and hit your performance limit. How do you get more out of your work? By working smarter, not harder – Get others on board, delegate, communicate. Nowhere is this truer than with computer hardware. Poorly written software makes increasing demands on resources but cannot deliver quantum jumps in performance.
As we evaluated earlier versions of EventTracker it became clear that we were soon reaching the physical limits of the underlying hardware and the choke point to getting faster reports was not to work harder (optimize Code) but to work smarter (plan up-front, divide and conquer, avoid searching through irrelevant data).
This is realized in the Virtual Collection Point architecture that is available in version 6. By segregating log sources up front into virtual groups and stacking software processes from reception to archiving, improvement in performance is possible FOR THE SAME HARDWARE!
When comparing SIEM solutions for scalability, remember that if the only path is to add more hardware, it’s a weaker approach than making the best of what you already have.
April 07, 2008
The three basic ingredients of any business are technology, processes and people. From an IT security standpoint, which of these is the weakest link in your organization? Whichever it is, it is likely to be the focus of attack.
Organizations around the globe routinely employ the use of powerful firewalls, anti-virus software and sophisticated intrusion-detection systems to guard precious information assets. Year in and year out, polls show the weakest link to be processes and the people behind them. In the SIEM world, the absence of a process to examine exception reports to detect non-obvious problems is one manifestation of process weakness.
The reality is that not all threats are obvious and detected/blocked by automation. You must apply the human element appropriately.
Another is to audit user activity especially privileged user activity. It must match approved requests and pass the reasonableness test (eg performed during business hours).
Earlier this decade, the focus of security was the perimeter and the internal network. Technologies such as firewalls and network based intrusion detection were all the rage. While these are necessary, vital even, defense in depth dictates that you look carefully at hosts and user activity.
March 18, 2008
The Gartner Group has long produced its Hype Cycle for IT technologies to show when technologies begin to offer practical benefits and become widely accepted. In 2006, Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) was located in the ‘Trough of Disillusionment’. This segment of the curve is supposed to represent a technology that has failed to meet expectations and become unfashionable therefore causing less coverage in the press. Gartner predicted emergence into the ‘Slope of Enlightenment’ in 2-5 years.
What can you do to avoid disillusionment?
Three words — Know your requirements
The lack of this is the single largest reason for failure of IT projects.
Basic advice, you say? Amazing how basic advice is the hardest to follow.
Watch the ball, mind your footwork. That sort of thing.
The market is awash with product offerings, each with similar claims but different heritages and usually optimized for different use-cases. Selection criteria should be your own needs. Mature vendors dislike failed projects as much as the sponsors because of the negative energy generated by the failure. Sharing your requirements sets expectations more correctly and therefore reduces the chances of energy sapping failures.
Aside of maturation of the technology itself, the other reason for the ‘trough’ is customer expectation and implementation methodology, which is usually outside vendor control. As SIEM comes into the mainstream, the basics apply more than ever. A mature customer with robust practices will get better results with new technology than those with poor habits get from well established technologies.
As Sun Tzu said, “he who knows neither himself nor his enemy can never win, he who knows himself but does not know his enemy will sometimes win and sometimes lose, but he who knows himself and his enemy will never lose.”
March 07, 2008
The 5 W’s of security management I’ve seen it happen about a thousand times if I’ve seen it once. A high profile project ends up in a ditch because there wasn’t a proper plan defined AHEAD of time. I see this more often in “squishy” projects like security management because success isn’t easily defined. It’s not like installing a web application firewall, which will be deemed a success if it blocks web attacks.
February 28, 2008
In October 2007 Gartner published a paper titled “Clients Should Prepare a ‘Recession Budget’ for 2008″. It suggested that IT organizations should be prepared to respond if a recession forces budget constraints in 2008. Its still early in 2008 but the FED appears to agree and has acted strongly by dropping key interest rates fast and hard.
Will this crimp your ability to secure funding for security initiatives? Vendor FUD tactics have been a bellwether but fear factor funding is waning for various reasons.These include
* crying wolf
* the perceived small impact of breaches (as opposed to the dire predictions)
* the absence of a widespread, debilitating (9/11 style) malware attack
* the realization that most regulations (eg HIPAA) have weak enforcement
As an InfoSec professional, how should you react?
For one thing, understand what drives your business and align with it as opposed to retreating into techno-speak. Accept that the company you work for is not in the business of being compliant or secure. Learn to have a business conversation about Infosec with business people. These are people that care about terms such as ROI, profit, shareholdervalue, labor, assets, expenses and so on. Recognize that their vision of regulatory compliance is driven mainly by the bottom line. In a recession year, these are more important than ever before.
For another thing, expect a cut in IT costs (it is after all most often viewed as a “cost-center”). This means staff, budgets and projects may be lost.
So how does a SIEM vendor respond? In a business-like way of course. By pointing out that one major reason for deploying such solutions is to “do more with less”, to automate the mundane thereby increasing productivity, by retaining company critical knowledge in policy so that you are less vulnerable to a RIF, by avoiding downtime which hurts the bottom line.
And as Gabriel Garcia Marquez observed , maybe it is possible to have Love in the Time of Cholera.
February 15, 2008
In the beginning, there was the Internet.
And it was good (especially for businesses).
It allowed processes to become web enabled.
It enabled efficiencies in both customer facing and supplier facing chains.
Then came the security attacks.
(Toto, I’ve got a feeling we’re not in Kansas any more).
And they were bad (especially for businesses).
So we firewalled.
And we patched.
And we implemented AV and NIDS.
Are we done then?
According to a leading analyst firm, an estimated 70% of security breaches are committed from inside a networks perimeter. This in turn is responsible for more than 95% of intrusions that result in significant financial losses. As a reaction, nearly every industry is now subject to compliance regulations that can only be fully addressed by applying host based security methods.
Security Information and Event Management systems (SIEM) can be of immense value here.
An effective SIEM solution centralizes event log information from various hosts and applies correlation rules to highlight (and ideally thwart) intrusions. In the instance of the “insider” threat, exception reports and review of privileged user activity is a critical activity.
If your IT Security efforts are totally focused on the perimeter and the internal network, you are likely to be missing a large and increasingly critical “brick in the wall”.
-Posted by Ananth
February 07, 2008
Interesting article by Russell Olsen on Windows Change Management on a Budget
He says: “An effective Windows change management process can be the difference between life and death in any organization. Windows managers who understand that are worth their weight in gold…knowing what changed and when it changed makes a big difference especially when something goes wrong. If this is so clear, why do so many of us struggle to implement or maintain an adequate change control process?”
Olsen correctly diagnoses the problem as one of discipline and commitment. Like exercising regularly, its hard….but there is overwhelming evidence of the benefits.
The EventTracker SIM Edition makes it a little easier by automatically taking system (file and registry) snapshots of Windows machines at periodic intervals for comparison either over time or against a golden baseline.
Given the gap between outbreak and vaccine for malware and attacks, as well as the potential for innocuous human error when dealing with complex machinery, the audit function makes it all worthwhile. The CSI 2007 survey shows the annual loss from such incidents to be $350,000.
Avoiding such losses (and regular exercise) will make you worth your weight in gold.
February 02, 2008
Understanding where SIM ends and log management begins In my travels, I tend to run into two types of security practitioners. The first I’ll call the “sailor.” These folks are basically adrift in the lake in a boat with many holes. They’ve got a little cup and they work hard every day trying to make sure the water doesn’t overcome the little ship and sink their craft. The others I’ll call the “builders,” and these folks have gotten past the sailor phase, gotten their ship to port and are trying to build a life in their new surroundings. Thus, they are trying to lay the foundation for a strong home that can withstand whatever the elements have to offer.
January 18, 2008
Selection criteria for pragmatic Log Management As we wrap up our 6-month tour of Pragmatic Log Management, let’s focus on what are some of the important buying criteria that you should consider when looking at log management offerings. Ultimately, a lot of the vendors in the space have done a good job of making all the products sound the same. So really deciphering what differentiates one product versus another is an art form.
January 17, 2008
Well this is starting to turn into a bit of a bun fight, which was not my intent as I was merely attempting to clarify some incorrect claims in the Splunk post. Well, now Anton has weighed in with his perspective:
“I think this debate is mostly about two approaches to logs: collect and parse some logs (typical SIEM approach) vs collect and index all logs (like, ahem, “IT search”).”
Yes, he is right in a sense. It is a great concise statement, but the statement needs to be looked at as there are some nuances here that need to be understood.
Just a bit of level-set before going to work on the meat of the statement.
Most SIEM solutions today have a real-time component, (typically a correlation engine), and some kind of analytics capability. Depending on the vendor some do one or the other better (and of course we all package and price them all differently).
Most of the “older” vendors started out as correlation vendors targeting F2000 enabling real-time threat detection in the SOC. The analytics piece was a bit of a secondary requirement, and secure, long term storage not so much as all. The Gartner guys called these vendors SEM or Security Event Management providers which is instructive – event to me implies a fairly short-term context. Since 2000, the analytics and reporting capability has become increasingly important as compliance has become the big driver. Many of the newer vendors in the SIEM market focused on solving the compliance use-case and these solutions typically featured secure and long term storage, compliance packs, good reporting etc. These new vendors were sometimes referred to as SIM or Security Information Management. These vendors fit a nice gap left in the capabilities of the correlation vendors. Some of the newer vendors like Loglogic made a nice business focusing on selling log collection solutions to large enterprise – typically as an augmentation to an existing SIM. Some of these newer vendors like Prism , focused on mid tier and provided lower-cost, easy to deploy solutions that did both compliance as well as provided real-time capabilities to companies that did not that did have the money or the people to afford the enterprise correlation guys. These companies had a compliance requirement and wanted to get some security improvements as well.
But really all of us, SIM/SEM, enterprise, mid-tier, Splunk were/are collecting the same darn logs – we were just doing slightly different things with them. So of course the correlation guys have released log aggregators (like Arcsight Logger), and the Log Management vendors have added or always had real-time capability. And at the end of the day we ended up getting lumped into the SIEM bucket, and here we are.
For anyone with a SIEM requirement… You should understand what your business requirements are and then look long and hard at the vendor’s capability – preferably by getting them in house to do an evaluation in your own environment. Buying according to which one claims to do the most events per second or supports the most devices, or even the one has the most mindshare in the market is really short sighted. Nothing beats using the solution in action for a few weeks, and this is a classic “the devil is in the details…”
So, back to Anton’s statement (finally!). When Anton refers to “collect and parse some logs” that is the typical simplification of the real-time security use case – you are looking for patterns of behavior and only certain logs are important because you are looking for attack patterns in specific event types.
The “collect and index all the logs” is the typical compliance use case. The indexing is simply the method of storing for efficient retrieval during analysis – again a typical analytics requirement.
Another side note. The importance of collecting all the logs is a risk assessment that the end user should do. Many people tend to collect “all” the logs because they don’t know what is important and it is deemed the easiest and safest approach. The biggest beneficiaries of that approach are the SIEM appliance vendors as they get to sell another proprietary box when the event volume goes through the roof, and of course those individuals that hold stock in EMC. Despite compression, a lot of logs is still a lot of logs!
Increasingly, customers I talk to are making a conscious decision to not collect or retain all the logs as there is overhead and a security risk in storing logs as they consider them sensitive data. Quite frankly you should look for a vendor that allows you to collect all the data, but also provides you with some fairly robust filtering capability in case you don’t want or need to. This is a topic for another day, however.
So when Anton claims that you need to do both – if you want to do real-time analysis as well as forensics and compliance -then yes, I agree, but when he claims the “collect and parse” is the typical SIEM approach then that is an overgeneralization, which really was the purpose of my post to begin with. I tend not to favor them as they simply misinform the reader.
January 15, 2008
I posted a commentary a while ago on a post by Raffy, who discussed the differences between IT Search (or Splunk, as they are the only folks I know who are trying to make IT Search a distinct product category) and SIEM. Raffy posted a clarification in response to my commentary. What I was pointing out in my original post was that all vendors, SIEM or Splunk, are loading the same standard formats – and what needed to be maintained was, in fact, not the basic loader, but the knowledge (the prioritization, the reports, alerts etc) of what to do with all that data. And the knowledge is a core part of the value that SIEM solutions provide. On that we seem to agree. And as Raffy points out, the Splunk guys are busily beavering away producing knowledge as well. Although be careful — you may wake up one morning and find that you have turned into a SIEM solution!
Sadly the concept of the bad “parser” or loader continues to creep in – Splunk does not need it which is good. SIEM systems do, which is bad.
I am reasonably familiar with quite a few of the offerings out there for doing SIEM/log management, and quite frankly, outside of perhaps Arcsight (I am giving Raffy the benefit of the doubt here as he used to work at Arcsight, so he would know better than I), I can’t think of a vendor that writes proprietary connectors or parsers to simply load raw data. We (EventTracker) certainly don’t. From an engineering standpoint, when there are standard formats like Windows EVT, Syslog and SNMP it would be pretty silly to create something else. Why would you? You write them only when there is a proprietary API or data format like Checkpoint where you absolutely have to. No difference here. I don’t see how this parser argument is in any way, shape or form indicative of a core difference.
I am waiting on Raffy’s promised follow-on post with some anticipation – he states that he will explain the many other differences between IT Search and SIEM, although he prefaced some of it with the Splunk is Google-like and Google is God ergo…
Google was/is a gamechanging application, and there are a number of things that made them unique – easy to use, fast, and the ability to return valuable information. But what made Google a gazillion dollar corporation is not the Natural Language Search – I mean, that is nice but simple “and” “or” “not” is really not a breakthrough in the grand scheme of things. Now the speed of the Google search, that is pretty impressive – but that is due to enormous server farms so that is mechanical. Most of the other early internet search vendors had both these capabilities. My early personal favorite was AltaVista, but I switched a long time ago to Google.
Why? What absolutely blew my socks off and continues to do so to this day about Google is their ability to figure out which of the 10 millions entries for my arbitrary search string are the ones I care about, and providing them, or some of them, to me in the first hundred entries. They find the needle in the proverbial haystack. Now that is spectacular (and highly proprietary) and the ranking algorithm is a closely guarded secret I hear. Someone once told me that lot of it is done around ranking from the millions of people doing similar searches – it is the sheer quantity of search users on the internet. The more searches they conduct the better they become. I can believe that. Google works because of the quantity of data and because the community is so large – and they have figured out a way to put the two together.
I wonder how an approach like that would work however, when you have a few admins searching a few dozen times a week. Not sure how that will translate, but I am looking forward to finding out!
January 14, 2008
Mid-size organizations continue to be tossed on the horns of the Security/Compliance dilemma. Is it reasonable to consider regulatory compliance a natural benefit of a security focused approach?
Consider why regulatory standards came into being in the first place. Some like PCI-DSS, FISMA and DCID/6 are largely driven by security concerns and the potential for loss of high value data. Others like Sarbanes-Oxley seek to establish responsibility for changes and are an incentive to blunt the insider threat. Vendor provided Best Practices have come about because of concerns about “attack surface” and “vulnerability”. Clearly security issues.
While large organizations can establish dedicated “compliance teams”, the high cost of such an approach precludes it as an option for mid tier organizations. If you could only have one team and effort and had to choose, its a no-brainer. Security wins. Accordingly, such organizations naturally consider that compliance efforts are folded into the security teams and budgets.
While this is a reasonable approach, recognize that some compliance regulations are more auditor and governance related and a strict security view is a misfit. An adaptation, is to transition the ownership of tools and their use from the security to the operational team.
The classic approach for mid-size organizations to the dilemma — start as a security focused initiative, transition to the operations team.
January 10, 2008
Did you know? PCI-DSS forbids storage of CVV
A recent Ecommerce Checkout Report stated that “55% of the Top 100 retailers require shoppers to give a CVV2, CID, or CVC number during the checkout process.” That’s great for anti-fraud and customer verification purposes, but it also creates a high level of risk around inappropriate information storage.
To clarify, the CVV (Card Verification Value) is actually a part of the of the magnetic track data in the card itself. CVV2/CVC2/CID information is the 3 or 4 digit code on the back of the signature strip of a credit or debit card (or on the front of American Express cards).
The Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) clearly states* that there are three pieces of data that may not be stored after authorization is complete (regardless of whether you are handling card-present or card-not-present transactions):
January 03, 2008
Came across an interesting blog entry by Raffy at Splunk. As a marketing guy I am jealous as they are generating a lot of buzz about “IT Search”. Splunk has led a lot of people that are knowledgeable to wonder how this is something different than what all the log management vendors have been providing.
Still, while Raffy touched on what is one of the real differences between IT Search and Log Management, he left a few of the salient points out in the discussion of a “connector” and how a connector puts you at the mercy of the vendor to produce the connector, and what happens when the log data format changes?
Let’s step back — at the most basic level in log management (or IT Search for that matter) you have to do 2 fundamental things, you have to help people 1) collect logs from a mess of different sources, and 2) help them do interesting things with them. The “do interesting things” includes the usual stuff like correlation, reporting, analytics, secure storage etc.
You can debate fiercely the relative robustness of collection architectures – and there are a number of differences if you are evaluating vendors you should look at. For the sake of this discussion however most any log management system worthy of its salt will have a collection mechanism for all the basic methods – if you handle (in no particular order) ODBC, Syslog, read the Windows event format, maybe SNMP, throw in a file reader for custom applications, well you have the collection pretty much covered..
The reality is, as Raffy points out, there are a few totally proprietary access methods to get logs like Checkpoint. It is far easier for a system or application vendor to write one of the standard methods. So getting access to the raw logs in some way, shape or form is straightforward.
So here is where the real difference between IT search and Log Management begins.
Raffy mentions a small change in the syslog format causing the connector to break. Well syslog is a standard so if it would not break any standard syslog receiver, what it actually meant is that the syslog message has not changed but the content had.
Log Management vendors provide “knowledge” about the logs beyond simple collection.
Let’s make an analogy – IT Search is like the NSA collecting all of the radio transmissions in all of the languages in the entire world. Pretty useful. However, if you want to make sense of the Russian ones you hire your Russian expert, Swahili, your Swahili expert and so on. You get the picture.
Logs are like languages — the fact of the matter is the only thing that is the same about logs is that the content is all different. If you happen to be an uber-log weenie and you understand the format of 20 different logs, simple IT Search is really powerful. If you are only concerned about a single log format like Windows (although Windows by itself is pretty darn arcane), IT Search can be a powerful tool. If you are like the rest of us whose entire lives are not spent understanding multiple log formats, or get really rusty because many of us often don’t get exposed to certain formats all the time, well, it gets a little harder. What Log Management vendors do is to help you ( as the user) out with the knowledge – rules that categorize important event logs from unimportant ones, alerts, reports that are configured to look for key words in the different log streams. How this is done is different from vendor to vendor – some normalize, i.e. translate logs into a standard canonical format, others don’t. And this knowledge is what can conceivably get out of date.
In IT Search, there is no possibility for anything to get out of date mainly because there is no knowledge, only the ability to search the log in its native format. Finally, if a Log Management vendor is storing the original log and you can search on it, your Log Management application gives you all the capability of IT Search.
Seems to me IT Search is much ado about nothing…
The rational approach to pretty much any IT project is the same…define the requirements, solutions, do a pilot project, implement/refine and operationalize.
Often you win or lose early at requirements gathering time.
So what should you keep in mind while defining requirements for a Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) project?
Look at it in two ways:
Well, for ourselves, we see a clear increase in attacks from the outside. These are increasingly sophisticated (which is expected I guess since it’s an arms race) and disturbingly indiscriminate. Attacks seem to be launched merely because we exist on the Internet and have connectivity and disconnecting from the Internet is not an option.
We see attacks that we recognize immediately (100 login failures between 2-3 AM). We see attacks that are not so obvious (http traffic from a server that should not have any). And we see the almost unrecognizable zero-day attacks. These appear to work their way through our defenses and manifest as subtle configuration changes.
Of the expert prognosticators, we (like many others) find that the PCI-DSS standard is a good middle ground between loosely defined guidelines (HIPAA anyone?) and vendor “Best Practices”.
The interesting thing is that PCI-DSS requirements seem to match what we see. Section 10 speaks to weaponry that can detect (and ideally remediate) the attacks and Section 11.5 speaks to the ability to detect configuration changes.
Its all SIEM, in the end.
So what are the requirements for SIEM?
As the saying goes — well begun is half done. Get your requirements correct and improve your odds of success.
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