I saw a headline a day or so ago on BankInfoSecurity.com about the Heartland data breach: Lawsuit: Heartland Knew Data Security Standard was ‘Insufficient’. It is worth a read as is the actual complaint document (remarkably readable for legalese, but I suspect the audience for this document was not other lawyers). The main proof of this insufficiency seems to be contained in point 56 in the complaint. I quote:
56. Heartland executives were well aware before the Data Breach occurred that the bare minimum PCI-DSS standards were insufficient to protect it from an attack by sophisticated hackers. For example, on a November 4, 2008 Earnings Call with analysts, Carr remarked that “[w]e also recognize the need to move beyond the lowest common denominator of data security, currently the PCI-DSS standards. We believe it is imperative to move to a higher standard for processing secure transactions, one which we have the ability to implement without waiting for the payments infrastructure to change.” Carr’s comment confirms that the PCI standards are minimal, and that the actual industry standard for security is much higher. (Emphasis added)
Despite not being a mathematician, I do know that the lowest common denominator does not mean minimal or barely adequate, but that aside lets look at the 2 claims in the last sentence.
It is increasingly popular to bash compliance regulations in the security industry these days and often with good reason. We have heard and made the arguments many times before that compliant does not equal secure and further, don’t embrace the standard, embrace the spirit or intent of the standard. But to be honest the PCI DSS Standard is far from minimal, especially by comparison to most other compliance regulations.
The issue with standards has been the fear that they make companies complacent. Does PCI-DSS make you safe from attacks from sophisticated hackers? Well, no, but there is no single regulation, standard or practice out there that will. You can make it hard or harder to get attacked, and PCI-DSS does make it harder, but impossible, no.
Is the Data Security Standard perfect? No. Is the industry safer with it than without it? I would venture a guess that in the case of PCI DSS it is, in fact. That there was significant groaning and a lot of work on the part of the industry to implement the standard would lead one to believe that they were not doing it prior and that there are not a lot of worthless requirements in the DSS. PCI DSS makes a company take positive steps like run vulnerability scans, examine logs for signs of intrusion, and encrypt data. If all those companies handling credit cards prior to the standard were not doing these things, imagine what it was like before?
The second claim is where the real absurdity lays — the assertion that the industry standard for security is so much better than PCI DSS. What industry standard are they talking about exactly? In reality, the industry standard for security is whatever the IT department can cajole, scare, or beg the executives into providing them in terms of budget and resources – which is as little as possible (remember this is capitalism – profits do matter). Using this as a basis, the actual standard for security is to do as little as possible for the least amount of money to avoid being successfully sued, your executives put in jail or losing business. Indeed PCI DSS forced companies to do more, but emphasis on the forced. (So, come to think of it maybe Heartland did not do the industry standard, as they are getting sued, but let’s wait on that outcome!).
Here is where I have my real problem with the entire matter. The statements taken together imply that Heartland had some special knowledge to the DSS’s shortcomings and did nothing, and indeed did not even do what other people in the industry were doing – the “industry standard”. The reality is anyone with a basic knowledge of cyber security and the PCI DSS would have known the limitations, this included no doubt many, many people on the staffs of the banks that are suing. So whatever knowledge Heartland had, the banks that were customers of Heartland knew as well, and even if they did not, Mr. Carr went so far as to announce it in the call noted above. If this statement was so contrary to the norm, why didn’t the banks act in the interest of their customers and insist Heartland shape up or fire them? What happened to the concept of the educated and responsible buyer?
If Heartland was not compliant I have little sympathy for them, or if it can be proved they were negligent, well, have at them. But the banks here took a risk getting into the credit card issuing business– and no doubt made a nice sum of money – but they knew the risk of a data breach and the follow-on expense existed. I thought the nature of risk was that you occasionally lose and in the case of business risk impacts your profits. This lawsuit seems to be like the recent financial bailout – the new expectation of risk in the financial community is when it works, pocket the money, and when it does not, blame someone else to make them pay or get a bailout!